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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Roger Stephen Shuffield, appeals from a judgment
entered against him in the Third Judicial District Court on a petition for
a Writ of Habeas Corpus.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant plead guilty to second degree murder in 1974 and was
sentenced to a term of life imprisonment.

On July 3, 1975, a Writ of

Habeas Corpus hearing was held before Judge G. Hal Taylor and his
petition was denied.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the lower court decision and that
petitioner be either given a new trial or released from custody.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In 197 4, the defendant was charged with Murder in the First
Degree, a capital offense.

His attorneys advised him that there was

a good chance that he would receive the death penalty if convicted and that
the defendant could avoid this risk by pleading guilty to Murder in the
Second Degree. The defendant, for the sole purpose of avoiding the death
penalty, plead guilty to Murder in the Second Degree. At the habeas
corpus hearing, the defendant testified that he was unaware of the fact
that by pleading guilty he was effectively giving up his right to confront
witnesses at trial.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEA WAS NOT KNOWINGLY AND
INTELLIGENTLY MADE BECAUSE IT WAS ENTERED UPON THE ADVICE
OF COUNSEL THAT THE DEATH PENALTY COULD HAVE BEEN IMPOSED
WHEN IN FACT UTAH'S DEATH PENALTY PROVISION WAS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, the United States Supreme
Court declared unconstitutional death penalty schemes which allow juries
to impose the death penalty in an arbitrary manner without adequate guidelines.
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In Kelbach and Lance v. Utah, 408 U.S. 935, 33 L. Ed. 2d 75, 92
S. Ct. 2858, (1972), the Utah Supreme Court's decision upholding
the· constitutionality of Utah's prior death penalty provision was appealed
to the United States Supreme Court. That court, in a memorandum decision
stated:
"Judgement vacated insofar as it leaves undisturbed the death
penalty imposed and case remanded to the Supreme Court
of Utah for further proceedings." 33 L. Ed. at 751
The court cited Stewart v. Massachusetts, 408 U.S. 845, 33 L. Ed. 744,
92 S. Ct. 2845 (1972), in which it held the Massachusetts death penalty
statute constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments.

It is thus clear that Utah's prior death penalty statute was
effectively declared unconstitutional in the Lance and Kelbach decision.
In that Utah's present states, Utah Code Annotated Section 76-3-207, does
not remedy the infirmities found to exist under the _prior statute, it also
is unconstitutional on the basis of Furman v. Georgia in that it allows the
jury to make the determination without adequate guidelines of whether a
defendant should live or die. It is clear from the above that the defendant
entered a guilty plea in fear of the death penalty provision which was
unconstitutional. It cannot reasonably be stated that such a plea was made
knowingly and intelligently when in fact the defendant gave up valuable
constitutional rights, e.g. Fifth Amendment rights, the right to a trial by
jury, the right to confrontation of witnesses, in return for nothing since he
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would have received the same penalty anyway. The present death penalty
provision states unequivocally that if this statute is ever declared
unqmstitutional, life imprisonment is the appropriate penalty. Therefore
at the time the defendant entered the guilty plea, the only penalty which
could have been mnstitutionally imposed was life imprisonment, the same
penalty that is imposed for the crime that the defendant plead guilty to.
In Shaw v. U.S. 299 F. Supp. 824 (1969), the defendant was
indicted for violation of the Federal Kidnapping Act and plead guilty to
avoid the death penalty provision which was subsequently held unconstitutional
in U.S. v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, The court, in holding that U. S. v .. Jackson
should be given retroactive effect, stated:
Plea voluntary on its face became involuntary in fact because of
the coercive effect of possible capital punishment which should
not have confronted the accused in making up his mind how to
plead. Life sentence was void and must be vacated. " 299 F.
Supp. at 833.
The record of the habeas corpus hearing discloses that the
defendant's sole reason for pleading guilty was to avoid the death penalty.
(R-ll). In Armstrong v. Egeler, 389 F. Supp. 483 (1975)~ the court held
that the fact that the defendant was not told he was eligible for parole
was a critical factor in determining whether the defendant's guilty plea was
intelligently made. The case law is thus clear on the point that knowledge
of possible sentencing is a "critical factor" in determining if a guilty plea
is intelligently entered. In that the defendant in the instant case entered his
guilty plea based upon the misconstrued validity of an unconsti.tutional
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death penalty provision, that plea and the consequent sentence of life
imprisonment must be vacated.
POINT II
THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW IN
VIOLATION OF BOYKIN V. ALABAMA, 395 U. S. 238, IN THAT THE
RECORD BELOW FAILS TO DISCLOSE THAT THE DEFENDANT
KNEW HE WAS WAIVING IMPORTANT CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
In Boykin v. Alabama, supra, the United States Supreme Court
set out the requirements for the trial court to adhere to in assuring that the
defendant knows that he is giving up specific constitutional rights when he
enters a plea of guilty to a crime. The court noted the grave importance
of such a requirement:
"Several federal constitutional rights are involved in a waiver
that takes place when a plea of guilty is entered in a state
criminal trial. First, is the privilege against compulsory
self-incirmination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and
applicable to the Sates by reaEO n of the Fourteenth. (Malloy
v. Hogan, 378 U. S!, 1). Second, is the right to trial by jury.
(Duncan v. Louisiana 391 U.S. 145). Third, is the right to
confront ones accusers:- (Pointer v. Texas, 380 u. s. 400)."
395 U. S. at 243
The court was explicit on the point that what is required by
due process is that the defendant know that he is giving up the al:ove
mentioned constitutional rights. The court stated:
"what is at stake for an accused facing death or imprisonment
demands the utmost solicitude of which courts are capable
in canvassing the matter with the accused to make sure he has
a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its
consequences." 395 U. S. at 243-244.
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The habeas corpus record in the instant case clearly reveals that
the defendant did not in fact know of the constitutional rights he was giving
up. The defendant specifically stated at the habeas corpus proceeding
that he was unaware that if he plead guilty, he would be waiving his right
to confront his accusers at trial. (R -10). Surely Boykin v. Alabama
requires more than a mere recital of the rights waived by a plea of
guilty. Boykin requires that the record below affirmatively disclose that the
defendant in fact know that he is waiving those rights. Anything less than
this relegates the due process clause to a matter of form rather than substance
and renders Boykin v. Alabama meaningless. It is thus clear that the
defendant was denied due process under Boykin v. Alabama in that he did
not know that he was waiving the right to confront his accusers when he
entered his guilty plea.
CONCLUSION

The defendant's guilty plea was not knowingly and intelligently
made because it was based upon an unconstitutional death penalty provisio11.
Additionally, defendant was denied due process of law in violation of
Boykin v. Alabama because the record below does not disclose that defendant
in fact knew that he was waiving his right to confront his accusers and
therefore the guilty plea was not voluntarily made. For the above-mentioned
reasons, defendant's plea of guilty and sentence of life imprisonment should
be vacated and a new trial should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,

STEPHEN R. McCAUGHEY
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